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David F. Elmer
In memoriam John Miles Foley1
The Iliad’s Politics of Consensus
 In a recent book (Elmer 2013) examining the representation of collective decision making 
in the Iliad, I have advanced two related claims: first, that the Iliad projects consensus as the 
ideal outcome of collective deliberation; and second, that the privileging of consensus can be 
meaningfully correlated with the nature of the poem as the product of an oral tradition.2  The 
Iliad’s politics, I argue, are best understood as a reflection of the dynamics of the tradition out of 
which the poem as we know it developed. In the course of the present essay, I intend to apply 
this approach to some of the other texts and traditions that  made up the poetic ecology of archaic 
Greece, in order to illustrate the diversity of this ecology and the contrast between two of its 
most important “habitats,” or contexts for performance: Panhellenic festivals and the 
symposium. I will examine representative examples from the lyric and elegiac traditions 
associated with the poets Alcaeus of Mytilene and Theognis of Megara, respectively, and I will 
cast a concluding glance over the Odyssey, which sketches an illuminating contrast between 
festival and symposium. I begin, however, by distilling some of the most important claims from 
my earlier work in order to establish a framework for my discussion.
 Scholars have been interested in the politics of the Homeric poems since antiquity. 
Ancient critics tended to draw from the poems lessons about proper political conduct, in 
accordance with a general tendency to view Homer as the great primordial educator of the 
Greeks. Thus Philodemus, in the first  century BCE, wrote a treatise called On the Good King 
according to Homer, extracting lessons from both poems about the appropriate exercise of 
power; Dio of Prusa has Alexander of Macedon expounding to his father, Philip, Homer’s 
Oral Tradition, 28/1 (2013): 143-166
1  This article is a lightly revised version of a paper delivered as the twenty-sixth annual Lord and Parry 
Lecture at the University of Missouri’s Center for Studies in Oral Tradition on March 13, 2012. Though I feel it is an 
inadequate tribute, I offer it to the memory of my gracious host on that occasion, John Miles Foley, whose work has 
been a constant source of inspiration for me.
2 This work focuses on the Iliad but also includes a short appendix on the Odyssey.
preeminent virtue as an instructor of princes (Oration 2).3 Modern scholars have tended instead 
to treat the poems as documents for early Greek history—or rather, prehistory. In the wake of 
Milman Parry’s demonstration of the thoroughly traditional character of Homeric poetry, it  has 
come to seem plausible that the poems, by preserving a tradition that antedates our earliest 
written texts in alphabetic Greek, may offer a precious glimpse into the prehistory of Greek 
politics. Historians are thus able to offer the poems as evidence for the political forms and 
structures of late Bronze Age and early  Iron Age Greece. Still the best-known example of this 
kind of argument is Moses Finley’s The World of Odysseus (1978 [1954]), which founds a 
number of claims about the society of the so-called Dark Age (roughly  1100-800 BCE) on 
nothing more than the testimony of these two literary texts.4
 The appeal of such an approach is readily  apparent—it holds the promise of providing 
access to a period for which textual sources are otherwise lacking—but so are the perils. One 
must always exercise caution when seeking to correlate a literary text with historical realia.5 This 
is particularly true when no external documentary evidence is available as a control. In the case 
of Homeric poetry, an additional problem arises from the very same circumstance that seemed to 
open up the possibility of a prehistory of Greek politics in the first place, namely, the 
indebtedness of the Homeric poems to a very lengthy oral tradition, as demonstrated by Milman 
Parry and Albert Lord. It is in the nature of such a tradition to preserve within its inherited and 
formulaic diction traces of chronologically diverse periods, so that the “Homeric World” 
described by Finley  is really  an amalgam of elements from very different eras.6  For example, 
within the world of the Iliad, the boar’s tusk helmet worn by Odysseus in Book 10—a Bronze 
Age piece of equipment that would not have been seen in Greece after, say, the fifteenth century 
BCE—can happily  coexist with Iron Age weapons and implements that first came into use 
centuries later. A similar kind of synthesis can be observed with regard to marriage customs, 
burial practices, and combat techniques. But if this is the case, how confident can we be that  the 
poems reflect a single, identifiable historical context with respect to political structures?
 My reading of politics in the Iliad attempts to resolve these interpretive difficulties by 
correlating the poem’s political dynamics not with a single, identifiable historical context  but 
rather with the dynamics that shaped the Iliadic tradition as it  developed over time. The Iliad, as I 
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3 Asmis 1991 offers an English translation and commentary on Philodemus’ treatise; see also Murray 1965, 
which emphasizes connections with the world of contemporary Roman politics. 
4 Finley 1978 [1954]. For other examples of this historicizing approach, see Morris 1986; van Wees 1992; 
Donlan 1997; and Raaflaub 1998. 
5 Tim Whitmarsh, responding to a review in the Bryn Mawr Classical Review,  gives an eloquent statement 
of the problem (BMCR 2012.02.54, http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2012/2012-02-54.html): “Of course literary works 
allude in all sorts of ways to contemporary structures and events, but as a rule they do so in opaque, multifarious, 
and sometimes self-contradictory ways. If we are to give a historicist account of such works, we have to do more 
than simply join the dots between features internal to the text and external reference points; we need, rather, to grasp 
(as best we can; this, I concede, is also an elusive quest) the nature of the particular form of textuality in question, 
and ask what kind of (phantasmatic, or kaleidoscopic) ‘history’ is being projected.”
6 Snodgrass 1974 (reprinted with introductory comments in Snodgrass 2006) remains a cogent exposition 
of the “composite” nature of the world represented by the Homeric poems. For a critical response to Snodgrass, see 
Morris 1986:105-15. Some writers (for instance, Allan 2006:9 n.40) go so far as to characterize the world of the 
Homeric heroes as a “fiction.”
have said, is the end product  of a lengthy  tradition, out of which the poem as we know it 
gradually evolved. This tradition can be conceptualized as a kind of long-term process of 
collective decision making, in which an emerging consensus among performers and audiences 
determined what counted as a legitimate performance of the story  of Achilles’ wrath. The 
rhapsodes who performed Homeric poetry  and their audiences were undoubtedly aware of their 
participation in an ongoing process of negotiation over the norms of Iliadic narrative. Such an 
awareness would have arisen naturally in the context of the large regional and supra-regional 
festivals in which Homeric poetry appears to have evolved, and which can be loosely  grouped 
together under the rubric of “Panhellenism.”7 These festivals, which were the premier venue for 
the performance of the Homeric poems, attracted visitors from the many diverse communities 
that made up the Greek world, each of which had its own distinctive heroic traditions. 
Performers at these festivals were faced with the task of presenting poetry that somehow 
connected with all of these traditions while corresponding exactly to none.8  At the same time, 
audiences would implicitly be asked to suspend their local allegiances by accepting and 
endorsing a performance that took a broader, more Panhellenic perspective. The Iliad and the 
Odyssey demonstrably reflect the cosmopolitan outlook of such Panhellenic audiences, and this 
reflection is a direct  result of the negotiation that would take place at every recurrence of a 
Panhellenic event such as the Panathenaic festival in Athens and could over time produce a 
masterpiece of cultural synthesis like the Iliad. At events such as these, audiences and performers 
would, as I have said, be made aware of their participation in an ongoing process of negotiation 
over the synthetic, Panhellenic narrative.9  And it is precisely this awareness, I claim, that is 
reflected in the Iliad’s distinctive representation of political deliberation and collective decision 
making.
 Approaching the politics of the Iliad in this way resolves the difficulty of finding a 
specific historical point of reference since the chronological depth that makes that task so 
difficult is now precisely  the point: the poem’s politics encode an awareness of the poem’s 
evolution over time. Moreover, this approach helps us to make sense of one of the more curious 
features of politics in the Iliad, which is the unique value the poem appears to set  on consensus 
as the optimal form of collective decision making. Consensus-based decision making is not a 
particularly prominent feature of historical Greek political cultures. In classical Athens, for 
example, reliance on the majority  principle permitted the flourishing of an adversarial political 
culture that set  no great store by solidarity. Meanwhile, the general preoccupation with civil 
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7 On Homeric poetry as a Panhellenic phenomenon, see the formulation of Nagy 1999 [1979]:7-8. Various 
festivals have been indicated as possible contexts for the composition and development of the Homeric poems. The 
Panathenaia features prominently in Nagy’s own “evolutionary model,” for which see Nagy 1996:chs. 5-7; Frame 
(2009:515-647) argues that the poems were composed in the context of the Panionia; Whitman (1958:76,  81) 
mentions both of these festivals, along with the Delia. (The poems may in fact reflect multiple performance 
contexts.) All of these festivals may be considered “Panhellenic” to various degrees (pace Davison 1955:12 on the 
limited appeal of the Panathenaia). For Panhellenism as a relative concept, see Nagy 2009:275.
8 I adapt here the phrasing of Nagy’s characterization of Homeric poetry as a Panhellenic tradition (1999 
[1979]:7): “this poetic tradition synthesizes the diverse local traditions of each major city-state into a unified 
Panhellenic model that suits most city-states but corresponds exactly to none.” 
9 For the Iliad as an example of the “synthetic narrative” of Panhellenic heroic traditions, see Marks 2010.
conflict (stasis) we observe in early Greek literature suggests that consensus was not  ordinarily a 
feature of archaic political life.10 Egon Flaig, author of a study on the “consensus principle” in 
the Iliad, has stressed the extent to which this principle does not match up with the political 
cultures of the historical Greek city-states (1994:30). As I have emphasized, however, the 
negotiation over the Panhellenic narrative tradition of the Iliad that took place at large festivals 
such as the Athenian Panathenaia can meaningfully be characterized in terms of consensus, for in 
such a context  the most successful performance would be the one that appealed most broadly to 
audiences with diverse local interests.
 Thus far my discussion has been fairly  abstract. Let me begin to introduce more concrete 
detail by explaining, in the first place, just how and where we can detect the privileging of 
consensus that I claim characterizes Iliadic politics. My comments will also, I hope, be 
interesting as an illustration of the formulaic technique described by Parry and Lord.
 Discussions of the political system represented in the Homeric poems typically  focus on 
the power of the ruler, who often seems to impose his own will on the group. Exhibit A is 
Agamemnon, who in Book 1 rejects a request to ransom a captive woman in spite of the approval 
of the Greek army as a whole and then forcefully appropriates a captive woman belonging to 
Achilles over the objections of his advisors. But closer examination reveals a clear and 
unambiguous set of signals that—in all cases in which a proposal is put before a group—it is in 
fact collective will that is decisive. The key here is a system of formulaic expressions that 
describe the responses of audiences in decision making contexts. There are in the Iliad exactly 
five ways in which an audience may respond to a deliberative proposal, each characterized by a 
distinctive verb. Listed according to representative types (some of which exhibit minor 
variations), they are:11
1. ὣς ἔφαθ᾿, οἳ δ᾿ ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ
He spoke thus, and they were all silent
3.95, 7.398, 8.28, 9.2912
2. ἔνθ᾿ ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες ἐπευφήμησαν Ἀχαιοί
Thereupon all the other Achaeans expressed support
1.22, 1.376
3. ὣς ἔφαθ᾿, οἳ δ᾿ ἄρα πάντες ἐπίαχον υἷες Ἀχαιῶν
He spoke thus, and all the sons of the Achaeans shouted in response
7.403, 9.50; cf. 2.333, 2.394
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10 Cf. Loraux 2002:30: “The egalitarian polis of consensus . . . exists because actual cities are divided.”
11 All translations in this essay are my own. Greek quotations are taken from the following editions: Allen 
1931 (Iliad); Burnet 1902 (Republic); Lobel and Page 1955 (Alcaeus); von der Muehll 1962 (Odyssey); Young 1971 
(Theognis).
12  In addition to these four occurrences in deliberative contexts, the formula is used six times to 
characterize responses to a challenge, to an appeal for individual action, or to a particularly astonishing speech 
(specifically, Achilles’  rejection of Agamemnon’s offer of compensation): see 7.92, 9.430, 9.693, 10.218, 10.313, 
and 23.676.
4. ὣς Ἕκτωρ ἀγόρευ᾿, ἐπὶ δὲ Τρῶες κελάδησαν
Hector spoke thus, and the Trojans roared in response
8.542, 18.310
5. ὣς ἔφαθ᾿, οἳ δ᾿ ἄρα πάντες ἐπῄνησαν βασιλῆες
He spoke thus, and all the kings approved
7.344, 9.710; cf. 2.335, 3.461, 4.29, 4.380, 16.443, 18.312, 21.290, 22.181, 23.539-40
Of these five responses, the first—“they  were all silent”—is unambiguously negative and signals 
the immediate rejection of a proposal. If an audience reacts with silence, we know immediately 
that the proposal in question will not be put into effect. The remaining four responses all appear 
to be positive, but in fact—and this is the crucial point—only one of them, the last, designates a 
definitive ratification. I have translated the key verb epaineîn as “approve,” but this is actually a 
poor approximation of the powerful social force encapsulated in this verb, a force that might 
justifiably  be equated with our notion of “consensus.” Only in the case of this response is a 
proposal immediately and without further qualification put into effect. Each of the other 
apparently  positive responses can be shown to be deficient in some respect, and each is, 
moreover, restricted to a fairly  specific set of circumstances so that none duplicates exactly the 
function of another. So rigid is this system and so direct the connection between audience 
response and the outcome of an assembly that explicit notice of a proposal’s efficacy becomes 
redundant once the audience’s reaction has been reported: silence automatically  means rejection, 
while the epaineîn formula—and that formula alone—indicates a decisive ratification that 
automatically carries a proposal into effect.
 The deficiencies affecting the three positive responses that are less than fully decisive can 
help  to clarify just what is so special about the fifth response. One of these deficiencies emerges 
clearly  in a scene I have already mentioned—Agamemnon’s rejection of a proposal to ransom a 
captive woman, which is, moreover, the event that sets the entire plot of the Iliad in motion. At 
the very beginning of Book 1, Chryses, priest of Apollo, comes to the Greek camp to sue for his 
daughter’s release (1.17-25):
Ἀτρεΐδαι τε καὶ ἄλλοι ἐϋκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί,
ὑμῖν μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν Ὀλύμπια δώματ’ ἔχοντες
ἐκπέρσαι Πριάμοιο πόλιν, εὖ δ’ οἴκαδ’ ἱκέσθαι·
παῖδα δ’ ἐμοὶ λύσαιτε φίλην, τὰ δ’ ἄποινα δέχεσθαι, 
ἁζόμενοι Διὸς υἱὸν ἑκηβόλον Ἀπόλλωνα.
ἔνθ’ ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες ἐπευφήμησαν Ἀχαιοὶ
αἰδεῖσθαί θ’ ἱερῆα καὶ ἀγλαὰ δέχθαι ἄποινα·
ἀλλ’ οὐκ Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ἥνδανε θυμῷ,
ἀλλὰ κακῶς ἀφίει, κρατερὸν δ’ ἐπὶ μῦθον ἔτελλε· 
“Sons of Atreus and you other well-greaved Achaeans,
may the gods who dwell on Olympus grant
that you sack Priam’s city, and return home safely.
 POETRY’S POLITICS IN ARCHAIC GREEK EPIC AND LYRIC 147
But release my dear child, and accept this ransom,
showing reverence for Apollo, the far-shooting son of Zeus.”
Then all the other Achaeans expressed support (epeuphēmein)
for respecting the priest and accepting the bright ransom.
But this did not please (handanein) the heart of Agamemnon son of Atreus;
he rudely dismissed the priest and enjoined on him a harsh word of command.
In these lines, the army at large expresses their support for Chryses’ request, but, we are told, 
“this did not please the heart of Agamemnon.” The crucial difference between this response, 
designated by the verb epeuphēmein, and the one designated by the verb epaineîn is that  in this 
case the response most emphatically does not include all members of the group. It falls short of 
the kind of total group cohesion that characterizes the epaineîn response, and it is precisely this 
cohesion that  permits us to speak of “consensus” in connection with the one decisive mode of 
collective approval. There are two things I would like to emphasize about this critical scene in 
Book 1. The first is the way the narrator speaks of what “pleases” Agamemnon. Throughout the 
Iliad and elsewhere in archaic Greek poetry, “pleasure” is a byword for the kind of strong 
personal preference that fractures a political community or social group, a preference that 
obstructs the formation of a consensus.13  References to what is “pleasing” or “displeasing” 
frequently highlight the fault lines in a community—perhaps because these sentiments are 
always experienced on a fundamentally individualized and personal basis and are not therefore 
easily collectivized. I mention this motif now because it will later prove to be significant in 
relation to the poetry of Theognis. The second thing I would like to stress about Iliad 1 is that, 
even if the collective response is not sufficient  to guarantee the immediate approval of Chryses’ 
request, Agamemnon is not therefore entitled to do as he pleases—he is still bound in an 
important sense by  collective will. When Apollo afflicts the army with a plague and another 
assembly  is convened to meet the crisis, Agamemnon is compelled to release the woman, his 
own preference notwithstanding. In other words, the absence of collective support  for the course 
of action he pursues dooms that course of action to failure. In this way  the poem emphasizes that 
collective will—and, more to the point, consensus—is absolutely essential to the achievement of 
any collective purpose.
 The poem begins, as I have said, with Agamemnon’s attempt to impose his own will over 
and against that of the group. If the rule that governs collective decision making in the Iliad is 
that the will of the group  should ultimately be decisive, then Agamemnon’s behavior at the 
beginning of the poem is an attempt to suspend the norms of deliberative practice. This attempt 
fails, and the rest of the poem can be regarded as a gradual movement toward the restoration of 
those norms, and in particular toward the restoration of consensus as the default way of reaching 
a decision. Interestingly, however, the poem never quite arrives at this implied goal. Even when 
consensus is achieved, it is always limited in some crucial respect. Up until the very  last lines of 
the poem, a fully cohesive collective will remains something much desired but never completely 
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13 I am speaking in particular of the semantics of the verb handanein (“please”), but I hasten to add that this 
“counter-consensual” use of the verb, while consistently observable in the Homeric corpus, is not universal, even in 
explicitly political contexts. The phrase ἔαδε πόλι  (“it pleased the city,” using the aorist of handanein) is broadly 
attested in Cretan inscriptions in connection with decisions enacted by the community. Cf. Ruzé 1983:302.
realized. This incomplete teleology is one feature that connects the representation of politics 
within the poem to the experiences of audiences in the real world: as Johannes Haubold (2000) 
has stressed, the communities depicted within the Homeric poems present an imperfect image of 
a potential that is implicitly  realizable only by the historical Greek communities for whom the 
poetry  was performed. It is in the world of the audience, in the consensus they achieve over the 
contours of the Iliadic tradition, that the desire for a cohesive collective will reaches fulfillment.
 Another indication of the way in which the poem’s politics reflect real-world negotiations 
over the shape of the tradition can be found in depictions of the Olympian gods as they  debate 
the events unfolding on the plain of Troy. These debates always focus on events crucial to the 
plot of the Iliad and to the larger Troy tradition. In them, we see the gods discussing and 
negotiating what the Troy  tradition should look like. We can take as an example a scene from 
Book 4, in which Zeus attempts to provoke Hera by proposing that the gods debate whether or 
not to exempt Troy from its fated destiny (4.5-29):
αὐτίκ’ ἐπειρᾶτο Κρονίδης ἐρεθιζέμεν Ἥρην 
κερτομίοις ἐπέεσσι παραβλήδην ἀγορεύων· 
 . . .
ἡμεῖς δὲ φραζώμεθ’ ὅπως ἔσται τάδε ἔργα, 
ἤ ῥ’ αὖτις πόλεμόν τε κακὸν καὶ φύλοπιν αἰνὴν 
ὄρσομεν, ἦ φιλότητα μετ’ ἀμφοτέροισι βάλωμεν.
εἰ δ’ αὖ πως τόδε πᾶσι φίλον καὶ ἡδὺ γένοιτο,
ἤτοι μὲν οἰκέοιτο πόλις Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος,
αὖτις δ’ Ἀργείην Ἑλένην Μενέλαος ἄγοιτο.
 . . .
Ἥρῃ δ’ οὐκ ἔχαδε στῆθος χόλον, ἀλλὰ προσηύδα·
αἰνότατε Κρονίδη ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες·
 . . .
ἕρδ’· ἀτὰρ οὔ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι.
Straightaway the son of Kronos tried to provoke a quarrel with Hera,
speaking maliciously with taunting words:
“  . . .
Let us consider how these matters will be:
will we again stir foul war and dread slaughter,
or should we establish friendship between them?
If, somehow, this should be dear and sweet to all, 
let the city of lord Priam live on, 
and let Menelaos take back Argive Helen.”
 . . .
Hera’s breast could not contain her anger; instead, she said:
“Most dread son of Kronos, what sort of speech have you uttered?
 . . .
Do as you like, but we other gods do not all approve (epaineîn).”
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This scene provides the basis for Egon Flaig’s study (1994) of the “consensus principle”: Zeus 
makes an unpopular proposal but is compelled by the objections of Hera to come around to a 
position that is acceptable to all. It  is the distinctly  metapoetic character of this debate—that is, 
the way in which it comments on one of the fundamental assumptions of the Iliadic tradition 
itself, namely, the destruction of Troy—that permits us to see here an image of the formation of 
agreement on Iliadic norms among historical audiences. The gods are discussing what the Iliad 
should look like—should it, in fact, lead to the destruction of Troy? Notice that, while Hera 
evokes consensus with her use of the verb epaineîn, she does so in order to withhold her consent. 
Consensus is not explicitly achieved in this scene; that  is because the true consensus over the 
Iliadic tradition belongs to the poem’s audiences.
 At least one representative of an ancient audience for Homeric poetry appears to have 
understood this scene in the way I am suggesting—that is, as a subordination of poetic tradition 
to collective will—and that person is no less an authority than Plato himself. In Book 2 of the 
Republic, Socrates speaks explicitly about shaping the Homeric poems so that they conform to 
the requirements of life in his ideal city. As he makes a set of increasingly specific suggestions 
about the kinds of poetic narrative that are to be included in the educational curriculum for the 
city’s guardians, he makes use of a variety of expressions to capture the notion of “inclusion” or 
“exclusion.” But when he comes to speak about  specific changes that must be made to the Iliad 
in particular in order to make it serviceable to the state, he adopts a distinctly Iliadic way of 
speaking. In fact, he alludes directly to the passage we have just been examining (Rep. 379e2-4):
τὴν δὲ τῶν ὅρκων καὶ  σπονδῶν σύγχυσιν, ἣν ὁ Πάνδαρος συνέχεεν, ἐάν τις φῇ  δι’ Ἀθηνᾶς 
τε καὶ Διὸς γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα. . . .
But if anyone should say that the violation of the treaty oaths and libations, which Pandaros 
confounded, came about through the agency of Athena and Zeus, we will not approve 
(epaineîn). . . .
Socrates’ remark points directly to the exchange between Zeus and Hera, the immediate 
aftermath of which is the dispatching of Athena to ensure that Pandaros violates the Trojans’ 
truce with the Achaeans, thereby  propelling events once more toward their inevitable conclusion, 
the destruction of Troy. Moreover, Socrates echoes Hera’s very words in insisting that the 
citizens of Kallipolis “will not approve” any telling of the story that attributes Pandaros’ actions 
to divine influence. Like Hera, Socrates uses the verb epaineîn to indicate more than mere 
disapproval: he means to say that the citizens of his ideal city will not accept the Iliad as it is into 
their repertoire of civic traditions (just as Hera and her faction will not accept Zeus’ proposed 
Iliad, an Iliad that ends in reconciliation rather than destruction). Socrates repeats this 
characteristically Iliadic locution the very next time that he comes to speak of a critical 
adjustment to the plot of the Iliad.14 By  appropriating the Iliad’s political vocabulary in this way, 
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14 Rep. 383a7-8: πολλὰ ἄρα Ὁμήρου ἐπαινοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ  ἐπαινεσόμεθα, τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου 
πομπὴν ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ  Ἀγαμέμνονι (“So,  though we approve much in Homer, this we will not approve: Zeus’ 
sending of the dream to Agamemnon”).
Plato makes clear that he is imagining the shaping of a poetic tradition in terms of the Iliadic 
depiction of consensus.15  It is a nice twist of irony  that he has Socrates expunge from his 
authorized Iliad the very scene that seems to license within the poem the subordination of poetic 
tradition to community standards.
 Plato is thinking, I suggest, not just in terms of a written text, but also in terms of a 
performance tradition. And his basic assumption—that a community has the ability to shape its 
performance traditions—corresponds to the way that very many  traditions work cross-culturally. 
Carl von Sydow, one of the founders of modern folkloristics, stressed the powerful influence 
exercised on traditions by what he called “passive tradition-bearers”—those members of a 
community  who, although they  may not be competent or authorized themselves to perform and 
transmit to others a given element of tradition, are nevertheless knowledgeable about it to a 
greater or lesser extent, and are therefore able to judge and evaluate the activities of “active 
tradition bearers,” whose competence extends to performance (1948:12-15). Many traditions 
have ways of making explicit the control exercised by such passive tradition-bearers over the 
realization of a tradition in performance. One relevant example is provided by the Kuba people 
of central Africa. On those ceremonial occasions when the chief offers an authoritative 
performance of the community’s historical traditions, there is a highly  formalized, even 
ritualized, way  of expressing collective approval. Jan Vansina reports their ritualized expressions 
of communal assent as follows (1965:207 n.4):
“We have indicated to those whose work it is to take up the words of the king. And/you/notables/if 
you have anything to say, then say it,” says the king. At the end he asks: “My mother’s clan, is it 
not thus?” “The mountains are thus, are thus,” is shouted in reply. The king continues: “And you, 
come along. Confirm what I have said.” The dignitaries mbeem and mbyeeng rise and declare that 
he has spoken the truth.
The response formula “the mountains are thus, are thus” and the declarations of tribal officials 
make explicit the role of the community in controlling and affirming group traditions. The Iliad’s 
language of consensus is only  a slightly  veiled way of pointing to the same collective power to 
authorize and shape a tradition, and in Plato’s hands it becomes just as explicit as these Kuba 
formulas.
The Politics of Sympotic Poetry and Song
 My argument so far has been that the Iliad’s representation of political dynamics reflects 
the dynamics of the poetic tradition that produced the Iliad, and, specifically, that the value the 
poem sets on consensus corresponds to the experiences of Iliadic tradition-bearers, both active 
and passive, in the particular performance context  of the large Panhellenic festivals. These 
festivals, however, were by no means the only context for the performance of traditional poetry 
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15  I do not mean to suggest that Plato’s ideal city is to be ruled by consensus, but only that Plato is 
exploiting the Iliad’s discourse of consensus in order to stress the subordination of poetic tradition to standards 
accepted as valid for the community as a whole.
in the archaic period. In fact, much of our extant corpus of archaic Greek poetry—especially 
when it comes to what is generally classed as “lyric” poetry—seems not to have belonged to the 
festival repertoire. Instead, many (if not most) surviving lyric poems and songs belonged to what 
we would call the “sympotic” repertoire, that is, the repertoire of songs customarily performed at 
the symposium, the male drinking-party that was an institution of central importance in the city-
states of the archaic period.16  The surviving poems and songs clearly derive from oral 
performance traditions, and in some cases we can actually observe signs of the development of 
these traditions over time in a way that parallels the development of the Homeric corpus.17 As a 
result, we are entitled to ask whether the poetry of the symposium does not similarly reflect the 
circumstances of its development, and whether it too might not  contain an image of the social 
and political world that reflects in some way the dynamics of the performance culture in which it 
is rooted.18
 Among the poets frequently associated with performance at symposia, two stand out for 
the prominence of political motifs in their poetry: Alcaeus of Mytilene, on the island of Lesbos, 
and Theognis of Megara, a Doric city near Athens. In speaking of individual poets tied to 
specific places, I do not mean to suggest that the poems associated with these figures should be 
understood as expressions of the biographical experience of a particular person at a particular 
place and time. Alcaeus and Theognis are as much traditional personae as they are historical 
persons, and the poems attributed to them undoubtedly give voice more to the tradition as a 
whole than to a particular author’s point of view. The tradition may have originated in a 
particular community and social environment—late seventh-century Mytilene, say—and so it 
may  be considerably less Panhellenic in orientation than the Homeric tradition. The important 
point, however, is that these poems reflect the concerns and experiences not so much of an 
original composer as of the many  composers and audiences that transmitted them in 
performance. Given that these poems originated in a “song culture” in which poems and songs 
were transmitted independently of written texts, the only way to account for their survival is to 
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16 Kurke (2000:86) asserts that the bulk of what remains of Greek lyric is sympotic poetry. For the purposes 
of this discussion, I treat “lyric” as a broader category than “melic” (or “sung”) poetry; I include within it the corpus 
of elegiac poetry, which could be sung or not, depending on the context,  but which was certainly not performed to 
the accompaniment of the lyre (as the term “lyric” ought strictly to imply).  On elegy as a sung medium (performed 
to the accompaniment of the aulos, or reed pipe),  see Faraone 2008:6-7, espec. n.22.  Bowie (1986) argues that, 
while the symposium is the only securely attested performance context for the poems of the surviving elegiac 
corpus, there existed in antiquity also a form of long, narrative elegy intended for performance at public festivals 
such as the Panathenaia. The existence of this “public” form of elegy can be expected to have heightened awareness 
of the distinctive features of sympotic elegy, especially with regard to the representation of political and social 
entities.
17 See, for instance, Nagy 1985 on the Theognidea, the corpus of elegiac poems attributed to Theognis of 
Megara: the so-called “Meliora” show signs of belonging to a more Panhellenic phase of the tradition than the so-
called “Deteriora.” Nagy’s argument implicates other elegists (for instance, Solon) in the development of elegiac 
poetry in the context of oral performance.
18  It is important to note that “the poetry of the symposium” is not necessarily restricted to lyric genres. 
Aloni (2010) argues that Hesiod’s Works and Days derives from a sympotic tradition of performance. Significantly, 
Aloni includes in his evidence numerous parallels with the poetry of Theognis, one of two poets I discuss below. 
Aloni’s observations on Hesiod’s politics could easily be correlated with my arguments about the sympotic origin of 
similar motifs in the poetry of Theognis and Alcaeus.
suppose that they resonated enough with a variety of performers and audiences to maintain their 
position in the performance tradition over time until they  could be collected in writing.19 In the 
case of Theognis, for example, we find references to historical events spanning many 
generations; the poetry of Theognis clearly represents a Megarian tradition of considerable 
chronological depth. When I speak of “Theognis” or “Alcaeus,” then, I speak of the traditions 
represented by these figures.
 Theognis and Alcaeus share more than just a preoccupation with politics. They also share 
a particular perspective on the politics of their communities: both speak from the point of view of 
the disenfranchised, alienated aristocrat, and in both cases the speaker’s experience of political 
estrangement is tied to some betrayal by former friends, that  is, a rupture in the social group to 
which the speaker once belonged.20 Consider these lines from a poem of Alcaeus, fragments of 
which were recovered from an ancient papyrus (fr. 130 LP, lines 16-20):
. . . ὀ τάλαις ἔγω
ζώω μοῖραν ἔχων ἀγροϊωτίκαν
ἰμέρρων ἀγόρας ἄκοσαι
καρ̣υ ̣[ζο]μένας ὦγεσιλαΐδα
καὶ β ̣[όλ ̣λ̣ας . . .
 . . . in misery
I live a rustic life,
longing to hear the herald’s summons
to the assembly, O son of Agesilaos,
and to the council . . . 
The speaker is in exile, longing to be reintegrated into the political community  to which he once 
belonged, represented here by the “assembly” and civic “council.” Fragments of other poems 
permit us to reconstruct a quasi-biographical narrative into which this situation can be fitted: as a 
member of an opposition faction, Alcaeus repeatedly  suffered exile, at one point  because of the 
rise to power of one of his own former associates, Pittakos. In a fragment transmitted in 
Aristotle’s Politics, Alcaeus depicts Pittakos’ rise to power as a matter of the collective will of 
the Mytileneans (fr. 348 LP):
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19 Kurke (2000:60-62) presents a succinct version of this argument; see also the incisive remarks of Aloni 
(2010:136-38) with regard to the apparent historical and biographical specificity of Hesiod’s Works and Days. The 
term “song culture” originates with Herington 1985.
20 The similarity between the ways in which alienation is expressed in the poetry of Theognis and Alcaeus 
is noted by Nagy (1993). Nagy’s explanation for this connection differs from the one presented here, although our 
arguments are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
τὸν κακοπατρίδαν
Φίττακον πόλιος τὰς ἀχόλω καὶ βαρυδαίμονος
ἐστάσαντο τύραννον, μέγ’ ἐπαίνεντες ἀόλλεες
   That base-born
Pittakos they have made tyrant of a city that forgets its anger and suffers the weight 
of an evil fortune, with a tremendous expression of collective approval (epainenai = epaineîn).21
What is most striking about these lines is that  the Homeric word for consensus—the verb 
epaineîn—is here used in what seems to be a very un-Homeric way to describe the unity of a 
splintered community, a community from which the poet and his friends are excluded. This 
usage is un-Homeric to the extent that Homeric poetry regards the cohesion signaled by the verb 
as something total and absolute. We might note, however, that Alcaeus’ lines resonate more 
profoundly if we hear in them an echo of Homeric usage: projecting an Iliadic vision of total 
solidarity onto the Mytileneans serves to emphasize the alienation of the speaker and his social 
group that much more.
 The image of Megara conjured in the poetry  of Theognis is, like Alcaeus’ Mytilene, an 
image of a fractured, divided community. The speaker of these poems, however, typically 
presents himself not as an exile but as a man still enmeshed in the life of his city, attempting to 
find some semblance of security amid its rival factions and shifting loyalties.22  Once again, a 
political vocabulary recognizable from the Iliad provides a prominent  index of social and 
political disorientation. Now, however, it  is not the language of unity  that resonates, but the 
language of discord and disaffection. I stressed above the way the Iliad signals Agamemnon’s 
disruption of social cohesion by  highlighting the individual preference that “pleases” him, and 
him alone. Theognis does something similar, referring again and again to the “pleasure” and 
“displeasure” of his fellow citizens as a way of pointing to the conflicting interests that divide the 
community  against itself. And it  is Theognis himself who does or does not please, as in these 
lines (367-70): 
οὐ δύναμαι γνῶναι νόον ἀστῶν ὅντιν’ ἔχουσιν· 
    οὔτε γὰρ εὖ ἕρδων ἁνδάνω οὔτε κακῶς·
μωμεῦνται δέ με πολλοί, ὁμῶς κακοὶ ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλοί·
    μιμεῖσθαι δ’ οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀσόφων δύναται.
I am not able to judge the disposition of the townsmen,
    for neither treating them well nor doing them harm do I please (handanein) them.
Many blame me—bad and good men alike—
    but no one who is without wisdom (asophos) is able to imitate (mimeîsthai) me.
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21  In the Aeolic dialect of Alcaeus, the present and imperfect tenses of the so-called “contract verbs” of 
Attic-Ionic (a class to which epaineîn belongs) are expressed according to the athematic conjugation of the so-called 
“-μι verbs.” That is, Alcaeus uses the Aeolic form corresponding to Homeric epaineîn.
22 Theognis’ repeated emphasis on the lack of any secure social relationship makes him a kind of “resident 
exile.” Trusting no one, he is cut off from social networks; not even his beloved Kyrnos is a reliable philos.
Of particular interest here is the way  that  the disapproval of Theognis’ fellow citizens is 
correlated with their inability to “imitate” him. The word for “imitation” here is mimeîsthai, the 
word that ultimately  gives us the term mimesis. In the context of archaic Greek poetry it has 
unmistakable performative connotations. Characterizing those who disapprove of him as 
“without wisdom,” another term with poetic and performative connotations, Theognis is saying 
not just that they won’t  be able to “imitate” him, but that they  won’t be able to perform him—
that is, perform the poetry of the Theognidean tradition.23  In other words, these verses are 
constructing the divisions within the society of Megara in terms of groups constituted in and 
through poetic performance. And the key  to being included in the select group of qualified 
performers of Theognidean poetry is whether or not Theognis “pleases.”
 An even richer example of the same device can be observed in the poem that has 
prompted more commentary  than any other in the Theognidean corpus, the so-called “Seal of 
Theognis” (19-26):
Κύρνε, σοφιζομένωι μὲν ἐμοὶ σφρηγὶς ἐπικείσθω
    τοῖσδ’ ἔπεσιν, λήσει δ’ οὔποτε κλεπτόμενα,
οὐδέ τις ἀλλάξει κάκιον τοὐσθλοῦ παρεόντος· 
    ὧδε δὲ πᾶς τις ἐρεῖ· ‘Θεύγνιδός ἐστιν ἔπη
τοῦ Μεγαρέως· πάντας δὲ κατ’ ἀνθρώπους ὀνομαστός.’
    ἀστοῖσιν δ’ οὔπω πᾶσιν ἁδεῖν δύναμαι·
οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, Πολυπαΐδη· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ Ζεύς
    οὔθ’ ὕων πάντεσσ’ ἁνδάνει οὔτ’ ἀνέχων.
O Kyrnos, as I practice my art, I will set a seal 
    on these verses—no theft will go unnoticed,
nor will anyone be able to substitute a worse one for the good one that is there.
    And everyone will say: “these are the verses of Theognis
of Megara; his name is recognized among all men.”
    But I am not yet able to please (handanein) all the townsmen.
This is hardly surprising, O son of Polypaos; for neither does Zeus
    please (handanein) all, either sending rain or withholding it.
These lines are remarkable for the direct way in which they speak about their own status as 
poetry. Each line would repay careful study. One could, for instance, explore at length the way 
the speaker ascribes a rigid fixity to his verses. Since oral traditions are very often characterized 
by the fluidity of their texts, which are constantly recomposed in performance, one might wonder 
whether this assertion does not belie my description of Theognidean poetry as the record of an 
oral performance tradition. And yet the speaker’s declaration could be paralleled by the evidence 
of many verifiably oral traditions in which performers profess to maintain the integrity of their 
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lines of Theognis, see Nagy 1996:223 and 2004:44.
songs with word-for-word accuracy,24 and in any case the claim to rigid fixity is itself belied by 
the internal evidence of the Theognidean corpus, which exhibits many examples of precisely the 
kind of variation and “multiformity” that characterizes oral traditions.25
 This is just one of many lines of inquiry opened up by this brief poem. I would like to 
focus, however, on the contrast between the universal fame the speaker envisions for himself in 
the future and the much more limited success he claims to enjoy here and now in the fractured 
community  of Megara. That limited success and the social fragmentation it  implies is once again 
indexed with reference to Theognis’ ability to “please”—an ability that he claims is never 
universalizable, since not even Zeus himself is able to “please all.”
 Gregory Nagy has suggested that we may understand this contrast in terms of a tension 
between the Panhellenic aspirations of Theognidean poetry  and its connection to the local 
traditions of Megara.26 Without a doubt, this is a very productive way of approaching these lines: 
the text envisions a degree of acceptance among all Hellenes that is on a par with the Panhellenic 
reception of Homeric poetry, and this eventual Panhellenic acceptance is brought into a certain 
relation with the status of Theognis’ poetry within his own community. But there is more to be 
said, I think, about the reason why  the poet’s here-and-now is characterized not by acceptance 
but by rejection, and why the speaker seems unable to attain in the present the kind of unified 
audience he imagines in the future. This is the specific problem I would like to address, in part 
by correlating Theognis’ professed alienation from his fellow-citizens with the similar situation 
of Alcaeus.
 One might seek to account for the convergences in the poetry  of Theognis and Alcaeus in 
terms of parallel historical circumstances, or even in terms of certain common developmental 
trends that are thought to have been widespread among the city-states of the late archaic period. I 
am thinking here of such commonplaces as the rise of tyranny as a political form and the 
disruption of traditional social hierarchies by the introduction of coined money. I prefer instead 
to account for these convergences in terms of a shared performance context, namely, the 
symposium. My reasoning on this point is identical to the reasoning I applied above in 
connection with the nature of poetic personae in the “song culture” of archaic Greece: in order to 
survive, these poems must have resonated with a variety of performers and audiences over time, 
and so they are unlikely to have preserved references to specific historical circumstances unless 
those references could also be made meaningful to potentially very different audiences at 
different times and places.27  Without discounting the meaning and importance of historical 
references in their original contexts, we must also take into account the trans-contextual 
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24 A very famous example is provided by the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian singers interviewed by Parry 
and Lord, many of whom claimed to be able to repeat a song they had heard riječ za riječ, “word for word.” On the 
meaning of this expression in context, see Foley 1990:44-45, 49-50. 
25 See, for example, the “doublets” 39-42~1081-82b and 619-20~1114a-b, explained by Nagy 1983:88-90 
in terms of the workings of oral poetry.
26 See Nagy 1985,  espec. §§16-19. For the possible reflection within the Theognidean corpus of relatively 
more and relatively less Panhellenic phases of the tradition, see Nagy 1983:90-91.
27  Nagy 2004 considers the sympotic transmission of Alcaeus in the light of this general approach to the 
dynamics of archaic and classical Greek song culture.
reconfiguration of meaning that, in the final analysis, is the only thing that permits us to explain 
the survival of the poetry. The constant in the early transmission history  of Alcaeus and Theognis 
is performance at the symposium. The symposium itself, it  should be stressed, was not a single, 
homogeneous phenomenon: there is evidence for its practice at a variety  of social and 
institutional levels.28  But by attending to certain consistent features of performance at the 
symposium we may isolate factors that  can account for the shared political sensibilities of the 
poetry of Theognis and Alcaeus.
 The salient feature of the symposium for my purposes is that it was the occasion for the 
gathering of a small group of men—typically somewhere between fourteen and thirty—who 
perceived themselves as being united by  a common social bond.29 This bond could have political 
overtones: symposia were an important means by which political parties and factions, such as the 
one to which Alcaeus is represented as belonging, could cement loyalties among members. But 
even in the absence of such overtones, the symposium provided the scene for the staging of 
solidarity among a select group  of closely interconnected individuals. And this was true 
regardless of the political aspirations or the social status of the participants. The various rituals of 
commensality by  which the symposiasts demonstrated their solidarity—including collective 
prayers, toasts, the coordinated consumption of wine, and, of course, the performance of song 
and poetry—all served to set apart the intimate bonds uniting the members of the sympotic group 
from the relatively weaker ties that linked them to the community at large. Which is to say that 
the symposium staged not only  solidarity but also separation and difference—difference from the 
broader civic community, which was in many ways a far less intense form of association.30
 It is, I suggest, in the contrast  between the symposium as an enclosed, secluded, intimate 
context for performance and the large, public festivals at which Homeric poetry was typically 
performed that we find an explanation for the preoccupation of sympotic poetry  with political 
alienation. Panhellenic festivals were inclusive events that gave attendees the experience of 
participation in a broad collectivity  that transcended even the boundaries of civic communities. 
This experience, as I have said, has left its imprint on the Iliadic vision of politics, which is a 
vision that privileges a maximally  inclusive consensus.31 The poetry of the symposium was no 
less sensitive to the occasion for its performance; but in this case, the tradition-bearers who 
shaped the poetry  did so in a context that stressed the isolation and exclusivity of a small, select 
social group  differentiated from the community at large. In fact, the performance of sympotic 
poetry  was one of the principal means by which participants reinforced this sense of 
separateness. The performer who re-created the persona of Alcaeus or Theognis at the 
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28 Cf. Hobden 2009.
29 On the spatial constraints of “sympotic space,” see Bergquist 1990, an investigation of the architectural 
expression of the need to foster “visual and auditory coherence” (39) among symposiasts—a need that imposes 
certain limits on the size of the gathering.
30 Cf. Bowie 1986:34: “The symposium is a social institution in which groups within the city strengthened 
their mutual bonds and expressed their identity as a group—and their difference from other groups—in a context 
which involved both ritual and relaxation.”
31  There are limits on this inclusivity; in Elmer 2012 I discuss the temporary establishment and ultimate 
failure of a “Greek and Trojan super-community” in Iliad Books 3 and 4.
symposium was also using that persona to construct a social space that set  the symposiasts apart 
from their civic community. This, I argue, is why  these figures seem continually  to stress their 
alienation from the political life of their cities: the poetry associated with them has been shaped 
by a performance context  that exploits a sense of detachment and difference in order to enhance 
the solidarity of those participating in the event.
 Now, perhaps, we can understand better why the universal acceptance of Theognis’ 
poetry  is always relegated to the future and never realizable in the present. This poetry imagines 
for itself a Panhellenic reception on a par with that of the Homeric tradition—and there is good 
evidence to suggest that it did, in fact, achieve such a status. If it  did, however, the vehicle by 
which it was transmitted throughout the Greek world was not the large, public festival but the 
symposium, a vehicle that derived a large share of its social power from its ability  to mark 
divisions within the community. Even if the Theognidean tradition could become Panhellenic, 
the modality of Homeric Panhellenism was permanently unavailable to it. And so it can only 
imagine universal acceptance on a Homeric scale, which it must conceive of as something 
attainable only in an indefinite and ever-deferred future. In the present, the tradition remains 
persistently skeptical of a cohesive response among the community as a whole. It focuses instead 
on the isolated figure of Theognis, who sets his own seal on his poetry  as a way of asserting an 
individualism that is largely independent of collective dynamics.
 I have been describing a contrast between two crucial performance contexts that 
characterize Homeric poetry, on the one hand, and sympotic poetry on the other. These contexts, 
I have argued, have significant consequences for the way  the poetry  in each case represents the 
political life of the community and, in the case of sympotic poetry, the position of the poet-figure 
with respect to that community. One of the most intriguing aspects of the picture I have sketched 
is that its outlines can already be discerned in the second of the two Homeric poems, the 
Odyssey. The Odyssey takes an extraordinarily self-conscious interest in the performance of 
poetry, offering portraits of two different singers: Phemios, the poet who performs for the suitors 
occupying Odysseus’ house on Ithaca, and Demodokos, the poet among the Phaeacians, the 
idealized community of island-dwellers who ultimately bring Odysseus back home. Although the 
Odyssey does not assign different generic repertoires to these two figures—all singers in the 
poem compose in hexameters, the medium of heroic poetry—it does nevertheless distinguish 
between the contexts in which they perform.
 Phemios sings for the suitors as they drink their wine after their meal.32  He sings, in 
essence, at a symposium—albeit one that exceeds by  a significant margin the normal dimensions 
of the classical symposium.33 To the extent that  this symposium is made up of young men whose 
principal loyalties are to themselves, and who have only loose connections with the civic 
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32 Cf. Telemakhos’ words at Od.  1.339-40:οἱ  δὲ σιωπῇ / οἶνον πινόντων (“let them [the suitors] drink 
their wine in silence”). Athena/Mentes had arrived while the meal was in progress. When Telemakhos rejoins the 
group after her departure, the evening is in the drinking phase.
33 According to Od. 16.247-53, there are 108 suitors.  This number exceeds the capacity of even the larger 
dining rooms surveyed by Bergquist (1990), if capacity is calculated by the number of couches that could be 
accommodated.  Bergquist points out,  however, that, since the custom of reclining was not adopted until the late 
seventh century BCE, one cannot calculate capacity by this method for the earliest period. In any case, we should be 
prepared to allow for a degree of exaggeration in the Odyssey.
community  of Ithaca, it  faithfully reflects the social dynamics of the archaic symposium as I 
have outlined them. The suitors are depicted as an enclosed, self-contained group that is set  apart 
from, and in many ways opposed to, Ithacan society at large. 
 The Phaeacian audience for the performances of Demodokos could not be more different. 
The feast at which Demodokos performs his first song may take place in the palace of the king, 
but it is explicitly and emphatically an inclusive occasion that brings together representatives of 
the entire community. The public nature of this gathering is reinforced when it  moves from the 
palace to the agora, the “public square” or “marketplace,” where Demodokos performs again on 
a program that also includes athletic contests and dance. Because of their public setting and the 
juxtaposition with athletic competition, some scholars have seen in Demodokos’ performances 
an image of precisely those public festivals that provided the occasion for Homeric poetry.34 In 
the contrast between Demodokos and Phemios, then, we can perceive the contrast between the 
public festival and the symposium as two very different contexts for the performance of poetry.
 This contrast is not confined, however, solely to the settings in which the two poets 
perform. It also shapes the identities the Odyssey assigns to each. Demodokos, the singer of the 
Phaeacians’ public gatherings, bears a name that identifies him explicitly  as a “poet of the 
people.” The name “Demodokos” means, literally, “he who is acceptable to the people.” (The 
“demo-” of “Demodokos” is the same as in “democracy.”) His very name, then, tells us that 
Demodokos, as a performer at public festivities, enjoys the kind of universal acceptance that a 
sympotic poet like Theognis can only dream of. And if Demodokos achieves this kind of 
acceptance, it is because his songs, too, are “acceptable to the people”—that is, they represent 
the collective tradition of the Phaeacians, for which Demodokos is simply the mouthpiece. 
 Things are very different with the suitors’ bard on Ithaca, Phemios. His name, too, is 
significant: it means “the man of utterance,” or perhaps “the rumor-man.”35 This name does not 
speak explicitly about Phemios’ connection to his community—but that fact in itself might point 
indirectly to a measure of detachment that would distinguish this figure from his Phaeacian 
counterpart. If the name is not conclusive, however, Phemios’ own characterization of his 
relationship  to his audience leaves no room for doubt. When Odysseus has killed the suitors, 
Phemios pleads for his own life to be spared by stressing his independence and autonomy 
(22.344-48):
γουνοῦμαί σ’, Ὀδυσεῦ· σὺ δέ μ’ αἴδεο καί μ’ ἐλέησον.
αὐτῷ τοι μετόπισθ’ ἄχος ἔσσεται, εἴ κεν ἀοιδὸν 
πέφνῃς, ὅς τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισιν ἀείδω.
αὐτοδίδακτος δ’ εἰμί, θεὸς δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἴμας
παντοίας ἐνέφυσεν. . . .
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34 See, for example, Ford 1992:116-17. Power (2010:209-11) links Demodokos to citharodic song, a variety 
of lyric song (often with strong epic overtones) that was prominently featured at many large festivals, including the 
Panathenaia in Athens.
35 See Bakker 2002:142.
I am pleading with you, Odysseus; have respect and pity for me.
You yourself will feel grief hereafter if you slay me,
a poet who sings for both gods and men.
I am self-taught, and a god has instilled songs
of all kinds in my mind. . . .
In these lines Phemios claims that he ought not to be held responsible for the suitors’ misdeeds. 
These remarks, and especially Phemios’ assertion that he is “self-taught,” have prompted long 
discussions by scholars, many of whom are troubled by the apparent contradiction in claiming 
simultaneously  to be both “self-taught” and divinely inspired.36  What these scholars miss, 
however, is the significance of the one source of poetic material that Phemios does not specify—
namely, the collective knowledge of the community. Phemios’ point is that, wherever his songs 
come from—whether from his own storehouse of themes or from knowledge vouchsafed by  the 
gods—they do not draw on the resources of the community for which he performs. Phemios, in 
other words, is no Demodokos, no spokesman for the collective traditions of his audience; he 
should not therefore be in any way identified with that audience.37
 There is a certain affinity between the autonomy claimed by Phemios and the assertive 
“seal” set on the Theognidean tradition in the “Seal of Theognis.” It is perhaps just as surprising 
to find a traditional poet announcing that he is “self-taught” as it  is to hear him declaring that his 
verses will remain forever unchanged in the course of their transmission. In both cases we are 
dealing with the self-assertion of an individualized persona. I would like to suggest that this 
individualization is directly related to the restricted scope of the audiences to which these 
personae address themselves. The poetry of the symposium expresses, even performs, a certain 
difference from the community at large, and so it must at least profess to present an independent 
point of view, even when it manifestly  represents a widespread tradition. Phemios, performing in 
a sympotic context, cannot be a “poet of the people” like Demodokos, so he must be a “self-
taught” singer instead. In constructing a contrast between these two singers, the Odyssey presents 
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36 Cf. Pucci 1987:230-31; Bakker 1997:137-38; Finkelberg 1998:54-57; Assaël 2001.
37  These remarks on the contrast between Demodokos and Phemios draw on my discussion at Elmer 
2013:230-31.
us with, so to speak, a Theognis and a Homer, and it encourages us to consider the differences 
between them in terms of the audiences they address.38
 It would be possible, I think, to extend this contrast between Phemios and Demodokos, 
Theognis and Homer to include archaic sympotic lyric and epic writ large. I am thinking here of 
the contrast between lyric’s preference for personalized, apparently autobiographical statements
—the so-called “lyric I”—and the impersonal, objective third-person of epic narration. Let me 
conclude, however, by  reflecting in a more general way on the politics of archaic Greek poetry. 
In spite of their many differences, both epic poetry—the poetry of the festival—and lyric poetry
—the poetry of the symposium—are profoundly political. Their politics, as I hope to have 
demonstrated, are closely tied to the circumstances and dynamics of oral performance. I want to 
stress, however, that political motifs in these traditions are not merely metaphors or allegories for 
facts of a different order. On the contrary, the performance of poetry was a fundamentally 
political event in archaic Greece: regardless of whether it occurred at the symposium or the 
festival, it articulated social and political relationships, heightening participants’ awareness of 
their connections to others in the audience and in society at large. It is essential to keep this 
political context in mind as we read the poetry of archaic Greece. It might even be said that all 
art, of all periods, becomes profoundly political as soon as it is activated and realized in some 
lived interaction with others.
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